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The Leadership Act and Its Policy
Requirement
CHANGING LAWS, NOT REALITY
Our focus has to be on changing reality, not changing laws.1
-Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn

INTRODUCTION
In 2009 alone, 2.6 million people were newly infected
with HIV.2 With the aim of reducing the number of people
contracting HIV/AIDS, Congress passed the United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act
of 2003 (Leadership Act), which provides funds to encourage
partnerships between various members of the international
community, including several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).3 Such partnerships often take the form of NGO
funding,4 administered through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).5 While this may sound
straightforward, there is a catch.
Many of the international NGOs working on the ground
provide programming to individuals who are identified as
having a high risk of contracting HIV, such as sex workers. As
a condition of Leadership Act funding, however, recipient
organizations must affirmatively adopt a policy statement,
which declares that the organization opposes prostitution and

1

NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING
OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 32 (2009).
2
JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNAIDS
REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 16 (2010).
3
22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006). While the Leadership Act contains funding and
programs to eradicate HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, the focus of this note is
the portion of the Leadership Act that targets HIV/AIDS. The Leadership Act took effect
in 2003, and Congress reauthorized the act in 2008. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7601 (West 2008).
4
The premise underlying such public private partnerships is that all parties
can work together in order to best make use of each group’s individual areas of
expertise, thereby strengthening the overall impact of preventing and treating
HIV/AIDS throughout the developing world. 22 U.S.C. § 7621(a)(3) (2006).
5
22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(a) (West 2008).
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sex trafficking (Policy Requirement).6 Failure to adopt such a
policy renders the organization ineligible for funding through
the Leadership Act.7
Pathfinder International (Pathfinder), the Alliance for
Open Society International (AOSI), and DKT International
(DKT) are among the NGOs that have received funding
through the Leadership Act.8 Through two separate lawsuits,
these three NGOs have challenged the Policy Requirement’s
legitimacy under the First Amendment.9 They claim that the
Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by imposing
an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of Leadership Act
funds.10 The outcomes of those suits have resulted in a circuit
split, which will soon be resolved by the Supreme Court.11
In DKT International, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for
International Development, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the federal government
could constitutionally require its agents to convey a specific
message and similarly require the agents to refrain from
participating in contrary behavior or communicating a contrary
message.12 In contrast, in Alliance for Open Society
International v. U.S. Agency for International Development
(AOSI), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the Policy Requirement raised significant constitutional
concerns, and it therefore upheld preliminary injunctions
enjoining USAID from enforcing the Policy Requirement
against Leadership Act funding recipients.13
This note examines the inherent contradictions that
exist within the Leadership Act and how the statute’s Policy
Requirement not only unconstitutionally impinges upon
grantees’ First Amendment rights but also undermines the
very aim of the Leadership Act itself—preventing the spread of
HIV/AIDS. By forcing grantees to adopt the government’s antiprostitution stance, the Leadership Act effectively blocks NGOs
from working with a high-risk group that would likely benefit

6

22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006).
Id.
8
See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency
for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
9
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225; DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 759.
10
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225; DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 759.
11
See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d 218, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
12
DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 763-64.
13
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 223.
7
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the most from education and support regarding how to prevent
or treat HIV/AIDS—girls and women working as sex workers.
Part I of this note outlines the key components of the
Leadership Act. Part II surveys the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, viewpoint-based restrictions, and the government
speech doctrine. Part III examines the circuit split created by
AOSI and DKT International. Part IV analyzes how the Policy
Requirement violates grantees’ First Amendment rights and
discusses its negative policy implications.
I.

THE LEADERSHIP ACT

The Leadership Act’s stated purpose is to “strengthen
and enhance United States leadership and the effectiveness of
the United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria pandemics.”14 In particular, the Leadership Act
provides resources to reduce the transmission and spread of
HIV/AIDS among girls and women, whom the Act identifies as
particularly vulnerable populations.15
As part of the legislative negotiations leading up to the
Leadership Act, Congress issued factual findings that women
are highly susceptible to contracting HIV/AIDS due largely to
their vulnerable social positions in many cultures.16
Unsurprisingly, Congress also found that sex work and “other
sexual victimization . . . degrad[e] . . . women and children.”17
Congress acknowledged that the sex industry was one of the
causes of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the Leadership Act
notes that in Cambodia alone, up to 40 percent of sex workers
have HIV.18 Finally, Congress stated that, according to the United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), “gender issues are
critical components in the effort to prevent HIV/AIDS.”19
According to Congress, a strong solution to the HIV/AIDS
crisis requires a holistic international approach that targets the
root causes underlying the spread of HIV/AIDS.20 Congress noted
that such an approach requires education and work on a local
level that spurs social and behavioral changes among high-risk

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

22 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 2008).
Id. § 7603(3)(A), (D).
Id. § 7601(3)(B).
Id. § 7601(23).
Id.
Id. § 7601(36)(C).
Id. § 7601(21).
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populations.21 In order to implement this holistic, localized, and
targeted approach, Congress made Leadership Act funding
available to NGOs.22 It found that collaborative work with NGOs
is an essential component to the international community’s
success in its efforts to vanquish HIV/AIDS.23 Therefore, Congress
designed the Leadership Act to prioritize the maintenance and
development of partnerships with NGOs.24
Congress, however, imposed a crucial and highly
restrictive condition on its funding.25 The Policy Requirement
reads:
No funds made available to carry out this chapter, or any
amendment made by this chapter, may be used to provide assistance
to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, except that this subsection
shall not apply to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International AIDS
Vaccine Initiative or to any United Nations agency.26

Concerns about the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement
arose almost immediately. In February 2004, shortly after the
Leadership Act took effect, the Department of Justice’s Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) warned that the Policy Requirement
would be unconstitutional if applied to U.S.-based
organizations.27 USAID heeded this warning for several months
21

Id. § 7601(21)(C) (“The magnitude and scope of the HIV/AIDS crisis demands
a comprehensive, long-term, international response . . . including . . . development and
implementation of national and community-based multisector strategies that address
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the individual, family, community, and national and
increase the participation of at-risk populations in programs designed to encourage
behavioral and social change . . . .”).
22
Id. § 7631(c).
23
Id. § 7621(a)(4) (“Sustaining existing public-private partnerships and
building new ones are critical to the success of the international community’s efforts to
combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases around the globe.”).
24
Id. § 7621(b)(1) (“It is the sense of Congress that—the sustainment and
promotion of public-private partnerships should be a priority element of the strategy
pursued by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other global
health crises[.]”).
25
22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)-(f) (2006).
26
Id. § 7631(f).
27
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
218, 225 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). The OLC initially refused
to release the memorandum that cautioned that the Policy Requirement could not be
constitutionally enforced against U.S. organizations. The Brennan Center for Justice,
which represents AOSI, Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, InterAction
and the Open Society Institute in the Second Circuit proceedings filed a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request to recover that memorandum and any other materials
from the OLC relating to enforcement of the Policy Requirement. Brennan Ctr. for
Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09 Civ. 8756 (VM), 2011
WL 4001146, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 697 F.3d
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and did not enforce the Policy Requirement.28 In September
2004, however, the OLC changed its position and asserted that
“‘there are reasonable arguments to support the[] constitutionality’
of applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based organizations.”29
So, in 2005, USAID began to enforce the Policy Requirement
against its U.S.-based grantees.30
In 2007, to further clarify the Policy Requirement and
guard against legal action, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and USAID promulgated guidelines
clarifying the scope of the Policy Requirement’s application.31
The guidelines stipulate that Leadership Act recipients may
work with affiliate organizations that do not adopt an antiprostitution policy statement, as long as the recipient
maintains “objective integrity and independence from any
affiliated organization that engages in activities inconsistent
with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution.”32
Importantly, however, the guidelines fail to explain what
constitutes activity that would be “inconsistent” with the Policy
Requirement. The application of the Policy Requirement raised
immediate
First
Amendment
concerns
under
the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and spurred additional
discussion of the government speech doctrine, both of which
will be explained in depth in the following section.
II.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE,
VIEWPOINT BASED DISCRIMINATION, AND THE RISE OF
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE

This part outlines the jurisprudence forming the core of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, explains viewpoint184, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2012). To date, the OLC has released a portion of the
February 2004 memorandum, though with large portions redacted.
Constitutionally Permissible Funding Restrictions for Sex Trafficking and
HIV/AIDS Prevention, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 2011 WL 4001146, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) (No. 09-cv-8756-VM),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2fdb4d2e5c42284e0a_fcm6bxtl3.pdf.
28
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225 (alteration in original).
29
Id. (quoting the OLC). The OLC declined to release the September 2004
opinion that deemed the Policy Requirement to be constitutional. The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Brennan Center’s FOIA
request in August 2011. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, 2011 WL
4001146, at *7. However, the September 2004 OLC memorandum was not covered by
the court’s order. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law v. U. S. Dep’t of
Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2012).
30
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225.
31
Id. at 225-26.
32
45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2010) (emphasis added).
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based discrimination, and discusses the government speech
doctrine. The confusing and complicated nature of the doctrines
and relevant case law led to the circuit split between DKT
International and AOSI, and the Supreme Court should aim to
clarify the doctrines when it decides AOSI.
A.

The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

Congress passed the Leadership Act pursuant to the
Spending Clause of the Constitution, which grants it the power
to “provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States.”33 Pursuant to its spending power, Congress may
condition its award of funding on compliance with “federal
statutory and administrative directives.”34 This concept has
given rise to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which at
its most basic level, stands for the idea that the federal
government may not condition the “receipt of a benefit or
subsidy [in a manner that impinges] upon a recipient’s
constitutionally protected rights.”35
Analysis under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
contains two key elements: a “conditioned government benefit”36
and an “affected constitutional right.”37 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applies to all government-conferred benefits,
even gratuitous benefits—that is, those benefits that the
government was not compelled to provide in the first place,38
such as funding through the Leadership Act. Importantly, the
government cannot grant a benefit on a whim or without
reason; benefits and spending must be in pursuit of the
“general Welfare of the United States.”39

33
34

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
35

Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 231 (citing Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). Scholar Kathleen Sullivan explains that, “Unconstitutional
conditions problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the
recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally
protects from government interference.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 (1989). Once a benefit impinges on a
constitutionally protected right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine then dictates
that the condition is subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
36
Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1422.
37
Id.
38
Kathleen Sullivan characterizes such benefits as “gratuities” or “matters of
political grace to be deferentially reviewed.” Id. at 1424.
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Sullivan, supra note 35,
at 1425 n.35.
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While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies
to all benefits, the doctrine applies only to those constitutional
rights that turn on the “exercise of autonomous choice by the
rightholder,”40 such as freedom of speech. In order to trigger the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the right in question must
be one that is subject to strict scrutiny, a standard of review
dictating that a government condition that impinges on a
constitutionally protected right is unconstitutional unless “it is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”41
The Second Circuit, through its synthesis of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, found that the infringements on speech in AOSI
and DKT International are subject to strict scrutiny.42
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its
corresponding case law have been characterized as a “minefield”43
and a “troubled area of jurisprudence in which a court ought not
entangle itself unnecessarily.”44 This note examines the
ambiguities of the doctrine, which lie at the heart of the circuit
split. While there are numerous Supreme Court cases that
analyze the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the cases of
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,45 FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California,46 and Rust v. Sullivan47 provide the
basis for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s application
in AOSI and DKT International.
In Regan, Taxation With Representation (TWR), a
nonprofit organization, filed suit after the Internal Revenue
Service denied its application for tax exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) because TWR engaged in substantial political
lobbying, which § 501(c)(3) prohibits.48 Under Regan, the Court
held that Congress’s choice to decline to subsidize TWR’s
political lobbying did not violate that organization’s First
Amendment rights, and therefore the denial of subsidies was

40

Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1426.
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984); Sullivan,
supra note 35, at 1427.
42
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 236; see also Alliance for Open
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 258-61 (S.D.N.Y.
2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011) (synthesizing Supreme Court unconstitutional
conditions jurisprudence and application of strict scrutiny to instances when a
condition improperly infringed upon a recipient’s First Amendment rights).
43
Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1415-16.
44
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991).
45
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
46
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
47
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
48
Regan, 461 U.S. at 543-45.
41
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not an unconstitutional condition.49 The Court construed the
prohibition against the use of tax-deductible donations for
lobbying as a choice by Congress to simply not subsidize TWR’s
lobbying activities with public funds—a decision that the Court
previously upheld in Cammarano v. United States.50 However,
the Court noted that if TWR made use of a dual structure, it
could continue to use tax-deductible donations for its publishing
and litigation activities under § 501(c)(3)51 and also receive nontax-deductible donations for its lobbying activities under
§ 501(c)(4). The Court reasoned that such a structure would not
raise constitutional concerns but rather would reflect a
Congressional decision to provide funding to support activities it
deemed to be in the public interest.52 The choice not to subsidize
TWR’s lobbying activities indicated Congress’s concern that the
organization might use public funds to “promote the private
interests of their members”—a benefit that would effectively be
“at the expense of taxpayers at large.”53
A year later, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine lay
at the heart of League of Women Voters, when the Court held that
Congress could not constitutionally condition the receipt of a
grant on the requirement that grantee stations refrain from any
and all editorializing.54 The Court explained that editorializing
warrants heavy First Amendment protections55 and held that
restrictions on broadcast outlets may only stand when they
satisfy heightened scrutiny—that is, when “the restriction is
narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental

49

Id. at 550-51. In Regan, the plaintiff, nonprofit organization Taxation
Without Representation (TWR) filed suit after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
denied TWR’s application for tax exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) organization. Id. at
542. The IRS denied TWR’s application for § 501(c)(3) status because TWR engaged in
lobbying, a prohibited activity under § 501(c)(3). TWR claimed that the prohibition
against lobbying under § 501(c)(3) violated TWR’s First Amendment rights because it
was an “unconstitutional condition on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions.” Id.
at 545 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court disagreed, finding the § 501(c)(3)
prohibition against lobbying a constitutional condition. Id. at 546.
50
Id. (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)). “Congress is
not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. In these cases, as in
Cammarano, Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any
First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
51
Id. at 544.
52
Id. at 550.
53
Id.
54
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984).
Congress authorized the funding in question through the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967. Id. at 366.
55
Id. at 375.
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interest.”56 In this case, the ban on editorializing was insufficiently
tailored to serve the government’s stated purpose of protecting
local broadcast stations from improper government influence.57
Therefore, the Court found the ban unconstitutional.58
The Court synthesized the dual model approach of
Regan with the reasoning of League of Women Voters in Rust v.
Sullivan.59 In Rust, the Court found that a provision of Title X
of the Public Health Service Act, which provided funding for
family planning services on the condition that “[n]one of the
funds . . . shall be used in programs where abortion is a method
of family planning,” was constitutional.60 The Court interpreted
the condition as a constitutionally permissible “value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion.”61 It reasoned that the statute’s
limits represented the government’s decision to fund an activity
that the government thought was in the public’s best interest
(preventative family planning measures) and decline to fund an
alternative family planning option (abortion).62
Rust characterized the Title X provision as simply
requiring that federal funds support the programs and projects
for which they were authorized—in this case, a Title X project
aimed to promote preventative family planning, not abortion.63
The Court emphasized that “the [g]overnment [was] not
denying a benefit to anyone,”64 nor was the government forcing
grantees to refrain from discussing abortion.65 Rather, grantees
56

Id. at 380.
Id. at 389, 398-99.
58
Id. at 398-99. League of Women Voters revisited the dual structure outlined
in Regan. Id. at 389. The Public Broadcasting Act did not provide a framework for
bifurcated grantee stations, but the Court noted that if Congress amended the Public
Broadcasting Act to allow an affiliate grantee station to editorialize with nonfederal
funds (and similarly provided that the federal fund recipient could not editorialize),
then that sort of dual model would be constitutional under Regan. Id. at 400. Given the
absence of such a provision, however, the Court declined to follow Regan and held that
the ban unconstitutionally limited grantee stations’ freedom of the press under the
First Amendment. Id. at 402.
59
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Title X grantees filed suit against
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, arguing that the restriction on abortionrelated speech and counseling was unconstitutional because the restriction conditioned
receipt of the benefit of Title X funding on relinquishing a constitutional right to speak
freely about abortion. Id. at 181, 196.
60
Id. at 178 (alterations in original) (internal quotations marks omitted).
61
Id. at 192-93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). Notably,
the Court applied this same analysis in Regan. Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
62
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
63
Id. at 196.
64
Id.
65
Id.
57
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could continue to “perform abortions, provide abortion-related
services, and engage in abortion advocacy” so long as those
activities were carried out “through programs that are separate
and independent from the program that receives Title X
funds”66—in other words, through an affiliate organization like
the 501(c)(4) discussed in Regan. Finally, the Rust Court clearly
articulated the scenarios in which an unconstitutional condition
typically exists: “‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve
situations in which the Government has placed a condition on
the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program
or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from
engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the
federally funded program.”67 The facts in Rust and the provisions
of Title X revealed no such condition. The Court’s analysis laid the
foundation for the development of the government speech doctrine
as an exception to viewpoint-based discrimination.
B.

Viewpoint-Based Discrimination and the Government
Speech Doctrine

At its core, the First Amendment stands for freedom of
expression, and it has given rise to jurisprudence that clearly
states that the government may not discriminate against a
certain viewpoint simply because it disagrees with it or deems
that viewpoint to be unsavory.68 In other words, the government
may not engage in viewpoint-based discrimination. Professor
Geoffrey R. Stone illuminates the distinction between viewpointbased discrimination and content-neutral regulations through a
66

Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)).
Id. at 197.
68
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)
(“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes [the First
Amendment].”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government
may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying
message expressed.”); see also Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government
Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 703 (2011) (“The first rule of free speech theory and
doctrine is that the government may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint
based simply on its disagreement with that viewpoint.”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413, 428 (1996) (“[T]he government may not restrict expressive activities
because it disagrees with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker.”); Andy
G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 367 (2009) (“One of the
most familiar axioms in all of First Amendment law is the general rule that the
government is not allowed to restrict private expression based on viewpoint.”).
67
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simple example: a law that bans all billboards is content neutral,
whereas a law that bans “all criticism of the anti-billboard law”
is viewpoint-based.69 The latter law is viewpoint-based because it
restricts communication based on its content, and more
specifically, based on the viewpoint in opposition to the antibillboard law.70 When a government regulation on private speech
is viewpoint-based, then it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the
government must show that the regulation is “narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest.”71 Such a restriction
is almost always found to violate the First Amendment.72
The critical issue in determining whether the
government is engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination is
best resolved by the following inquiry: What is the government’s
purpose in regulating the speech in question?73 If the purpose of
the restriction is to silence an unpopular viewpoint or a
viewpoint the government disagrees with, then that restriction
is unconstitutional.74 If, on the other hand, the purpose of the
restriction is to ensure accurate portrayal of the government’s
own policy or define the scope of a government program, then
such a restriction, even if it is viewpoint-based, is
constitutional.75 Today, this concept represents the core of the
government speech doctrine.
69

Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1983).
70
Id. at 198.
71
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (“Our precedents thus apply the
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”); see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991); Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the [s]tate to enforce
a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”); Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (“A content-based government
speech restriction receives the most rigorous scrutiny, which is almost always fatal.”);
Kagan, supra note 68, at 443 (“Formulations of the standard used to review contentbased action vary, but the Court most often requires the government to show a
compelling interest that could not be attained through less restrictive means.
Application of this standard usually leads to a law’s invalidation.”).
72
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641;
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
73
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (“[T]he ‘principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it
conveys.’” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
74
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116; Police
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
75
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194,
196 (1991)).
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Scholars and the Supreme Court alike identify Rust as
the origin of the government speech doctrine,76 although Rust
did not expressly name the doctrine. Rust held that the
government could regulate private citizens’ speech as it related
to a government-funded program.77 Under the government
speech doctrine, when the government uses private speakers to
convey a government position or viewpoint, it may limit the
private speakers’ speech in order to ensure an accurate
portrayal of the government’s position.78 In other words, the
private speakers are conveying “government speech,” and the
First Amendment “does not regulate government speech.”79
For example, in Rust, the government chose to “selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believe[d] to be
in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program.”80 In particular, through Title X funding,
the government promoted its view favoring preventative family
planning over abortion. The regulations corresponding to Title
X defined the scope of funded programs to exclude abortion and
include preventative family planning measures.81 In turn,
healthcare providers administering the programs on the ground
conveyed the government message promoting preventative
family planning, thereby articulating the government’s speech.82
Accordingly, the regulations prohibiting Title X grantees from
engaging in abortion-related speech were narrowly tailored to
serve the programmatic purpose of Title X—to promote
preventative family planning.83
The government speech doctrine is paradoxical to the
First Amendment. While the First Amendment prohibits
viewpoint-based discrimination, the government speech doctrine
76

Id. at 833. Rosenberger articulated that public funding intended to
facilitate expression through something like student publications, could not be
conditioned on the content of that expression. Id. at 827-28. To do so constitutes
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 834. Rosenberger noted, however, that
when funding aims to facilitate expression of government viewpoints and perspectives
through private speakers, as was the case with the Title X programs in Rust, then the
government may impose conditions “to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee.” Id. at 833; Blocher, supra note 68 at 708; Daniel W. Park,
Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and
Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 124 (2009).
77
Park, supra note 76, at 125.
78
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009)
(citations omitted); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
79
Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 555 U.S. at 467.
80
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
81
Id. at 179-80.
82
Id. at 198-99.
83
Id. at 195 n.4 (1991); Park, supra note 76, at 126.
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carves out a loophole and creates instances when the
government can do just that: regulate speech related to a
specific viewpoint when doing so is in the service of
communicating the government’s own perspective.84 Quite
simply, when there is government speech, the First Amendment
and its concurrent regulations do not apply.
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to offer clear
guidelines on how to determine whether speech qualifies as
government speech.85 The Court has dodged the question,
stating in a recent case that “[t]here may be situations in which
it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on
its own behalf . . . , but this case does not present such a
situation.”86 Justice Stevens, in his dissent from Pleasant Grove
City, Utah v. Summum, described the government speech
doctrine as “recently minted,”87 and Justice Souter cautioned
that “it would do well for [the Supreme Court] to go slow in
setting its bounds.”88 While the Supreme Court continues to
sort out the boundaries and elements of government speech,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit developed what
has become the leading test for identifying government
speech.89 In Wells v. City and County of Denver, the Tenth
Circuit considered four factors in determining whether speech
qualifies as government speech:
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
“literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.90

Justice O’Connor, sitting by designation on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, adopted the Wells test,91 as has
the Ninth Circuit.92 Whether the Leadership Act’s Policy

84

Olree, supra note 68, at 368 (“[I]f the speech is the government’s own
speech, the viewpoint restrictions are permissible, but if the speech is private speech
facilitated by government resources, viewpoint restrictions are generally
impermissible.”).
85
Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001).
86
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
87
Id. at 481.
88
Id. at 485.
89
Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140.
90
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir.
2008); accord Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141.
91
Turner, 534 F.3d at 354.
92
Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Requirement constitutes government speech lies at the heart of
DKT International and AOSI.
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

A.

DKT International v. U.S. Agency for International
Development

DKT is an NGO that engages in international family
planning education and HIV/AIDS prevention; DKT is also a
subgrantee of Family Health International (FHI).93 In June
2005, FHI provided DKT with an agreement to operate a
program that distributes condoms and condom lubricants,
funded by USAID.94 The agreement included “a certification
that ‘DKT has a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking.’”95 But DKT refused to adopt that policy and did not
sign the agreement.96 As a result, FHI cancelled DKT’s grant
and declined to provide DKT with additional funding.97
DKT refused to adopt the anti-prostitution policy
because it was concerned that doing so would “stigmatiz[e] and
alienat[e]”98 sex workers, who are extremely vulnerable to
contracting HIV/AIDS.99 DKT brought suit against USAID in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the
Policy Requirement violated DKT’s First Amendment rights by
restraining its speech in other areas of work for which it did
not receive federal funds. Additionally, DKT alleged that the
Policy Requirement “force[d] DKT to convey a message with
which it does not necessarily agree.”100 The district court sided
with DKT, finding that the Policy Requirement violated the
First Amendment because it “constitute[d] [a] view point based
restriction[] on speech” and is “not narrowly tailored to further
a compelling government interest.”101
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed.102 The court distinguished League of Women
93

DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
96
Id. at 761.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 18 (D.D.C.
2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
102
DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
94
95
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Voters and relied on Rust to find that when the government
offers funding to promote its own policy—in this case, fighting
HIV/AIDS and discouraging prostitution—then it may impose
conditions to ensure that grantees deliver the government
policy and do not engage in contrary behavior or convey
contradictory messages.103 The D.C. Circuit supported its
position by citing the government’s brief, which stated:
It would make little sense for the government to provide billions of
dollars to encourage the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks,
including prostitution and sex trafficking, and yet to engage as
partners in this effort organizations that are neutral toward or even
actively promote the same practices sought to be eradicated. The
effectiveness of the government’s viewpoint-based program would be
substantially undermined, and the government’s message confused,
if the organizations hired to implement that program by providing
HIV/AIDS programs and services to the public could advance an
opposite viewpoint in their privately-funded operations.104

The court concluded that the Policy Requirement did
not compel DKT to promote a certain policy, but created a
condition whereby DKT had to “communicate the message”105
behind the policy that the government chose to fund. The court
therefore found the Policy Requirement to be constitutional.106
B.

Alliance for Open Society International v. U.S. Agency
for International Development

Four years after the D.C. Circuit Court found the Policy
Requirement constitutional, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion, holding that
the Policy Requirement was unconstitutional.107 In AOSI, two
NGOs, Pathfinder and AOSI, sought a preliminary injunction
against USAID and HHS (among others), which would bar
enforcement of the Policy Requirement.108 Pathfinder and AOSI
argued that the Policy Requirement limited the work they could
carry out with funding from private donors, and that it restricted
their ability to express ideas that may be “insufficiently opposed
to prostitution” under the Policy Requirement.109
103

Id. at 761-62.
Id. at 762-63 (quoting USAID brief).
105
Id. at 764.
106
Id.
107
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
218, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
108
Id. at 225.
109
Id.
104
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AOSI’s program, the Drug Demand Reduction Program,
targets high-risk groups, including sex workers, to help contain
the use of injection drugs in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan.110 The program is funded by USAID and by a sizeable
grant from the Open Society Institute.111 Pathfinder runs a
number of programs addressing HIV/AIDS prevention, including
a program in India that organizes sex workers, and educates
and encourages them to engage in safe sex practices.112 The
program also includes elements of community outreach that
entail working with pimps and brothel owners.113
In order to comply with the Policy Requirement, both
AOSI and Pathfinder adopted policy statements opposing
prostitution.114 Shortly thereafter, both NGOs filed suit against
USAID.115 AOSI claimed that the Policy Requirement forced
“the organization to engage in speech against its own will,”116
and Pathfinder argued that the Policy Requirement prevented
the organization from continuing its work in educating and
organizing sex workers, which was made possible through
private funding.117 Both organizations sought a declaratory
judgment limiting the scope of the Policy Requirement’s
application or, in the alternative, declaring the Policy
Requirement unconstitutional.118
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York applied strict scrutiny to the Policy Requirement, finding
that “when a spending enactment substantially impairs First
Amendment protected activity conducted by private entities with
private funds as a condition of receiving a government benefit,
heightened scrutiny is warranted.”119 Under strict scrutiny
analysis, the court asked whether the Policy Requirement was
“narrowly tailored to fit Congress’s intent.”120 The court held that
the Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored because it
acted as “a blanket ban on certain constitutionally protected

110

Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp.
2d 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 228.
115
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
116
Id. at 238.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 259.
120
Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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speech”121 without serving the government’s stated purpose of
fighting HIV/AIDS.122 As a result, the court granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining further enforcement of the
Policy Requirement.123
On appeal, the defendants informed the Second Circuit
that they were developing guidelines that they believed would
mitigate the constitutional issues underlying the Policy
Requirement.124 The Second Circuit therefore remanded the case
to the district court for findings on whether the preliminary
injunction still constituted appropriate relief.125 On remand, the
district court found that the injunction remained an appropriate
remedy because, even though the guidelines appeared to bring
the Policy Requirement in line with the dual structure approved
in Rust, they nevertheless failed to address the fact that the
Policy Requirement compelled speech.126 Accordingly, defendants’
revised guidelines failed to mitigate First Amendment concerns.127
On appeal a second time, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s findings. The Second Circuit measured the
Policy Requirement against the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, finding that it far exceeded the funding conditions
outlined in Regan, League of Women Voters, and Rust—cases in
which the government prohibited funding recipients from
engaging in certain types of speech.128 The court’s concern was
not simply that the Policy Requirement limits speech, but that it
compels speech.129 Moreover, the speech that the Policy
Requirement compels is not neutral but is instead viewpointbased, because it requires Leadership Act grantees to espouse the
government’s anti-prostitution perspective.130 As established in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,131
“viewpoint-based intrusions on free speech offend the First

121

Id. at 270.
Id. at 269.
123
Id. at 278.
124
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
218, 226 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
125
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843,
846 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
126
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 F. Supp.
2d 533, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
928 (2013).
127
Id.
128
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 234.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 234-35.
131
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).
122
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Amendment.”132 Because the Policy Requirement compels
viewpoint-based speech, the Second Circuit held that it was
subject to heightened scrutiny.133 The court then found that the
Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve the
Leadership Act’s purpose of fighting HIV/AIDS.134 The court
concluded that the Policy Requirement improperly compelled
grantees to adopt and convey the government’s position
opposing prostitution, and it found that Pathfinder and AOSI
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
First Amendment claim.135 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari for the case on January 11, 2013.136
IV.

ANALYSIS

As established above, the Policy Requirement created a
circuit split between the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.
This note contends that the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in DKT
International erroneously classified the Policy Requirement as
government speech—by equating it with the Title X speech
restrictions that the Court deemed acceptable in Rust—and
therefore bestowed upon it the concomitant allowance of
viewpoint-based discrimination.137 The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, recognized the Policy Requirement as an
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction on private speech, one
that is overly broad and fails to serve the underlying purpose of
the Leadership Act—to eradicate HIV/AIDS.138 The Second
Circuit’s analysis represents not only a logical extension of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but also a strong publicpolicy decision that supports the global battle against HIV/AIDS.
A.

The Purpose of the Leadership Act and the Policy
Requirement

To determine the constitutionality of the Policy
Requirement and its proper categorization as either viewpointbased discrimination or government speech, it is necessary,
first, to examine its purpose within the context of the
132

Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 235 (citing Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 828).
133
Id. at 236.
134
Id. at 237.
135
Id. at 239.
136
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2013).
137
DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
138
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 237-39.
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Leadership Act as a whole.139 The bottom line is that the purpose
of the Leadership Act is to strengthen U.S. leadership and efficacy
in an ongoing, global battle against HIV/AIDS.140 To achieve this
goal, the Leadership Act provides for consideration of gender
equity issues and targeted outreach toward vulnerable
populations.141 Sex workers constitute a vulnerable population,
and Congress points to the sex industry as one of the causes of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.142 Additionally, and quite significantly,
the Leadership Act explicitly recognizes that NGOs have
valuable on-the-ground experience and expertise, which make
them a critical part of the U.S. effort to reduce the spread of
HIV/AIDS.143
Within the context of the Leadership Act’s overarching
purpose to eradicate HIV/AIDS, the Policy Requirement simply
does not belong. On its face, the Policy Requirement might
appear to further the Leadership Act’s consideration of gender
equity issues—after all, the Policy Requirement condemns
prostitution and any support of prostitution, seemingly in
support of women’s autonomy.144 Moreover, prostitution is nearly
universally abhorred. But, this is an oversimplification. The
Policy Requirement is actually the manifestation of conservative
political ideologies, which Republican and Democratic
representatives hotly debated while drafting the statute.
Republican desires to include the requirement divorced the
ideal of ending prostitution from the reality of preventing and
combating HIV/AIDS. This ratification of conservative ideals
subsequently tied the hands of the NGOs that Congress
wanted to partner with.
Republican Congressman Chris Smith, known for his
strong pro-life politics and socially conservative perspective,
introduced the Policy Requirement as an amendment to the
Leadership Act, and the House Committee on International
Relations approved the amendment by a slim margin, “24 ayes
to 22 noes.”145 After approval by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, the Leadership Act returned
139

See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
22 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 2012).
141
Id. § 7601(21)(C).
142
Id. § 7601(23).
143
Id. §§ 7601(18), 7621(a)(2)-(4).
144
Id. § 7631(f).
145
H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 29 (2003); Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and
Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARV. J.
L. & GENDER 225, 243 (2011).
140
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to the House for final approval of amendments proposed by the
Senate. During that session, Congressman Todd Akin (R-NJ)
voiced additional support for the Policy Requirement, stating,
“We have received word that there are groups who actively
promote prostitution on their Web site, that they have received
U.S. tax dollars in the past, and that is why [the Policy
Requirement] is important and why it must be enforced.”146 In
his statement of support, however, Congressman Akin did not
offer any evidence of how grantees promoted prostitution.147
Opposition to the Policy Requirement came solely from the
other side of the aisle. Democratic Congressman José Serrano (DNY) cautioned that the amendment was “overreaching” and “too
broad.”148 Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) characterized
the Policy Requirement as “a bad piece of public health policy”
and proceeded to describe it as “counterproductive to achieving
our long term goals of reducing the spread of the disease, and
treating those already infected.”149 Finally, Congresswoman Lee
cut to the heart of the Policy Requirement, articulating the
issue that has become the core of the dispute between NGOs
and USAID: “How can an organization that is seeking to
mitigate the risk of infection for sex workers reach out to these
women when we require them to have an affirmative policy in
place that would turn these very women away from receiving
education and treatment for HIV/AIDS?”150
Nicholas Kristof, New York Times columnist, author,
and human rights advocate, suggests that feminist ideologies,
morality, and most importantly, politics, create division over a
fact that both sides of the aisle actually agree on—that child
prostitution and forced prostitution are horrendous realities.151
This note argues that the Policy Requirement represents just
such a division. Professor Aziza Ahmed and the Guttmacher
Institute, a sexual and reproductive health policy institute,
liken the Policy Requirement to other socially conservative
policies such as the “Global Gag Rule,” which required
international organizations receiving U.S.-based financial

146

150 CONG. REC. H5348, 5357 (July 8, 2004) (statement of Rep. Todd Akin
(R-MO) commenting on the Policy Requirement).
147
Id.
148
Id. at 5358 (statement of Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) opposing the Policy
Requirement).
149
Id. (statement of Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) opposing the Policy Requirement).
150
Id.
151
KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 1, at 25.
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assistance to denounce and dissociate themselves from abortion
and promote abstinence-based sex education.152
In addition to the fact that the Policy Requirement
represents partisan perspectives, the Leadership Act specifically
provides for its inconsistent application, further highlighting its
lack of functionality. The Leadership Act carves out an
exception to the Policy Requirement for the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the World Health
Organization; the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative; and any
United Nations agency.153 This exception is quite large, and it
applies to agencies carrying out work that is nearly identical to
that of AOSI, DKT International, and Pathfinder International.
For example, the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA)—a United Nations agency that describes its mission
as “promot[ing] the right of every woman, man and child to
enjoy a life of health and equal opportunity”154—is exempt from
the Policy Requirement, even though UNFPA regularly engages
with sex workers as part of its work to combat HIV/AIDS.
UNFPA’s work involves HIV prevention among vulnerable
populations, including sex workers.155 In fact, UNFPA actually
works alongside Pathfinder International, one of the plaintiffs in
AOSI, as part of the Maternal Health Task Force, a collaborative
effort by like-minded organizations to address maternal morbidity
and mortality and their related causes, such as HIV/AIDS.156
In this manner, the Policy Requirement’s purpose is
further called into question because the requirement works
against one of the stated aims of the Leadership Act—to
intensify public–private partnerships as part of the strategy to
combat HIV/AIDS.157 In effect, the Policy Requirement ties the
hands of NGOs engaged in critical HIV/AIDS-focused work on
152

Ahmed, supra note 145, at 242-43; Susan A. Cohen, Ominous Convergence:
Sex Trafficking, Prostitution and International Family Planning, 8 GUTTMACHER REP.
ON PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 2005, at 12, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/
1/gr080112.html.
153
22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(f) (West 2008).
154
Population Issues Overview, UNFPA, http://web.unfpa.org/issues/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
155
Preventing HIV/AIDS, Focus on Especially Vulnerable Groups, UNFPA,
http://www.unfpa.org/hiv/groups.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). Ironically, the
Leadership Act cites UNAID as its source for statistics on HIV/AIDS and gender, even
though UNAID’s work is spearheaded by UNFPA, whose work would not comply with the
Policy Requirement if it were to be applied to UNFPA. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7601(36)(A)-(C).
156
Mission, MATERNAL HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://maternalhealthtaskforce.org/
component/content/article/1-pages/23-mhtf-mission (last visited Feb. 27, 2013); see also The
MHTF Partner Channel, MATERNAL HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://maternalhealthtaskforce.org/
collaborate-1/partners (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
157
22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7603(4), 7621(b)(1)-(2).
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the ground.158 Even though the Leadership Act recognizes that
NGOs possess expertise and knowledge that are critical to
effectively reduce the spread and transmission of HIV/AIDS,159
the Policy Requirement blocks NGOs from exercising their best
practices. Such contradictions within the Leadership Act
indicate that the Policy Requirement does not further the goals
of the Leadership Act itself, but rather functions as an
expression of a conservative viewpoint.
B.

The Policy Requirement Constitutes Viewpoint
Discrimination and Is Unconstitutional Under the First
Amendment

As discussed in Part II.B, the U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the government may not regulate private
speech when its primary purpose is to quash a particular
viewpoint.160 When a regulation on speech is viewpoint-based, it
is subject to strict scrutiny—that is, the regulation is
presumptively unconstitutional unless the government can show
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.161 As outlined in Part IV.A, the Policy
Requirement serves no functional purpose within the Leadership
Act, let alone a compelling governmental interest. As a result, the
Policy Requirement fails the threshold requirement for a finding
of constitutionality under strict scrutiny analysis.
But, even if we were to suppose that it serves a
compelling governmental interest, the Policy Requirement and
its corresponding guidelines are far too broad to qualify as a
narrowly tailored legislative program under a strict scrutiny
analysis. Although the Policy Requirement seems straightforward
in its call for “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex
trafficking,”162 its corresponding guidelines call for grantees to
maintain “objective integrity and independence from any
158

Jodi Jacobson, UPDATED: Federal Appeals Court Overturns United States
“Prostitution Pledge” for U.S. Groups; Int’l Orgs Still Subject to Pledge, RH REALITY
CHECK (July 6, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2011/07/06/federalappeals-court-overturns-united-states-prostitution-pledge (“[P]rograms that might
otherwise [have] been funded were dropped, irrespective of whether the strategies
involved had been proven to reduce the spread of HIV. Moreover, programs recognized
around the world for their successes in working with marginalized populations such as
sex workers and other marginalized populations have been de-funded.”).
159
22 U.S.C.A. § 7621(a), (b).
160
See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
161
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
162
22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(f).
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affiliated organization that engages in activities inconsistent
with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution
and sex trafficking . . . .”163 These guidelines, however, fail to
define what types of activities are “inconsistent” with the antiprostitution policy statement.
In fact, after hearing oral arguments in AOSI, the
Second Circuit noted that it had “the distinct impression that
not even Defendants have a grasp on what it means to engage
in expression that is ‘inconsistent’ with an opposition to
prostitution.”164 Indeed, AOSI, shortly after adopting its antiprostitution policy statement, sought confirmation from USAID
that the policy statement complied with the Policy Requirement.165
But this query yielded little clarification. AOSI claimed that
Kent Hill, Acting Assistant Administrator for Global Health at
USAID, offered the following guidance: “(1) organizations that
promoted the legalization of prostitution would violate the
requirement and (2) organizations that limited their activities
to providing health services to prostitutes would be in
compliance.”166 According to the district court’s opinion, Hill was
unable to offer any further information about activities that
might fall in between those two positions.167 When even a
USAID official charged with enforcing the Policy Requirement
cannot articulate exactly what it demands of grantees, that
requirement and its affiliated regulations cannot be characterized
as “narrowly tailored.” Therefore, under strict scrutiny analysis,
the Policy Requirement should be held to represent
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.168
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45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2010).
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d
218, 240 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
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Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp.
2d 222, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 928 (2013).
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Id. at 236.
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Id.
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For additional scholarship on how the Policy Requirement constitutes
viewpoint-based discrimination, see Garima Malhotra, Good Intentions, Bad
Consequences: How Congress’s Efforts to Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of
Humanitarian Organizations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839 (2012). Other scholars have
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Anti-Prostitution Policy Statements Are Not Government
Speech

Because viewpoint-based discrimination is constitutional
only in the context of government speech, the Policy Requirement
will be deemed constitutional only if an organization’s antiprostitution policy statement qualifies as government speech. To
determine whether the anti-prostitution policy statement may
qualify as government speech, the Tenth Circuit offers a fourfactor test under which a court must consider:
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
“literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.169

I will examine each element in turn.
The DKT International court improperly characterized
the Policy Requirement as reflective of the government’s
purpose in the Leadership Act.170 According to the D.C. Circuit,
the governmental purpose of the Policy Requirement is to
“eradicate HIV/AIDS” by “speak[ing] out against legalizing
prostitution in other countries.”171 This characterization allowed
the court to conclude that, through the Policy Requirement,
“the government’s own message is being delivered.”172 The D.C.
Circuit found that the viewpoint-based Policy Requirement is
constitutional, because it represents “criteria to ensure that [the
government’s] message is conveyed in an efficient and effective
fashion.”173 The D.C. Circuit mischaracterized the Leadership Act
as legislation that is meant to convey the government’s message
opposing prostitution.174 This “recast[s] a condition on funding as
a mere definition” of the government program—a tactic that the
Supreme Court has rejected explicitly.175 The section of the
Leadership Act that defines its purpose makes no mention of
prostitution whatsoever.176 In contrast, the purpose of the
169
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Leadership Act and the NGO programs it funds is to strengthen
U.S. leadership in the effort to eradicate HIV/AIDS, increase
resources available to fight HIV/AIDS, and increase access to
healthcare and treatments.177
The second element of the Tenth Circuit’s government
speech test, which evaluates the degree of editorial control
exercised by the government or the private party, also supports
a conclusion that the anti-prostitution policy statement is not
government speech. The NGOs, not the government, maintained
editorial control over the anti-prostitution policy statements. The
Leadership Act does not dictate what the policy statements must
say, and the regulations that HHS promulgated do not clarify
Unlike
DKT
the
Policy
Requirement’s
meaning.178
179
International, AOSI and Pathfinder each adopted their own
individualized policy statements. AOSI’s policy statement read:
AOSI and the Soros Foundation in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
believe that trafficking and sex work do harm both to the individuals
directly involved and to others in various ways. AOSI and the Soros
Foundations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not promote or
advocate such activities. Rather, our approach is to try to reduce the
harms caused by disseminating credible information on questions
such as the prevention of disease, and by providing direct public
health assistance to vulnerable populations . . . .180

Pathfinder’s policy statement read:
In order to be eligible for federal funding for HIV/AIDS, Pathfinder
opposes prostitution and sex trafficking because of the harm they cause
primarily to women. Pathfinder’s HIV/AIDS programs seek to promote
effective ways to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS and to reduce
the suffering caused by HIV/AIDS. In order to achieve these goals,
Pathfinder works with, and provides assistance and support to and for,
many vulnerable groups, including women who are commercial sex
workers, who, if not effectively reached by HIV/AIDS programs, will
suffer and can become drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.181

Both the absence of regulatory guidance about the contents of
the policy statement and the distinct statements adopted by
AOSI and Pathfinder signal that the federal government did
not exercise control over the editorial content of the policy
statement. Similarly, under the third factor, it is clear that the
177
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anti-prostitution policy statements are not government speech.
Indeed, the Leadership Act grantees published the policy
statements in their capacity as private organizations, in order
to retain their funding; the government was not the speaker
behind the individual policy statements.
The fourth and final factor, which requires
consideration of who bears the ultimate responsibility for the
speech in question, also supports a finding that the antiprostitution policy statements do not qualify as government
speech. The Tenth Circuit and Fourth Circuit cases, however,
shed little light on how to best conduct this analysis. These
cases provided rather clear facts that left little doubt that the
speech in question was government speech.182 While the
government may contend that it bears the ultimate
responsibility for any anti-prostitution policy statement because
it provides funding for HIV/AIDS eradication programs,
common sense indicates that the NGOs are ultimately
accountable, because they must deal with the consequences of
the policy statement. These consequences include ostracizing
the vulnerable populations that they wish to serve or losing
additional funding from private donors.
The dissent in Wells v. City and County of Denver
advocated consideration of an additional factor in determining
who bears the ultimate responsibility related to the policy
statement: “who the listener believes to be the speaker.”183 In
this case, the listener or reader would reasonably believe that
the “speaker” for an anti-prostitution policy statement is the
NGO that published the statement. For example, AOSI’s policy
statement made no reference to the fact that it published the
policy statement solely to ensure retention of Leadership Act
funding.184 Although Pathfinder did qualify its policy statement
with the language “[i]n order to be eligible for federal funding
for HIV/AIDS, Pathfinder opposes prostitution,”185 such a
disclaimer does not negate the fact that in its own materials
Pathfinder still took a public position opposing prostitution.
182
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Quite simply, there is no reason that a reader of an antiprostitution policy statement would believe that the government,
rather than the NGO, is the true source of the anti-prostitution
policy statement.
Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs suggests that a deeper
analysis is warranted in order to determine who bears ultimate
responsibility for the speech in question, which she characterizes
as “accountability.”186 Jacobs argues that government speech will
be illegitimate unless the government “adequately inform[s]” the
public that that the government “is speaking through private
speakers and provid[ing] the content” that is being expressed.187
Jacobs assesses whether the government has adequately
informed the public of its intent to speak by examining whether
the government meets two requirements: (1) “general
accountability” and (2) “specific accountability.”188 The general
accountability requirement asks whether the government
authorized the speech in question “in a legitimate and publicly
visible process,”189 such as valid enactment of a piece of
legislation. This requirement is generally easy to satisfy, and
because the Leadership Act constitutes a validly enacted piece
of legislation, it meets this first requirement.
The specific accountability requirement is less easily
satisfied, because it focuses on the audience’s interpretation of
the speech in question, rather than on the process through
which the legislation was enacted.190 Jacobs argues that when
speech targets a specific population, “the government must
make them reasonably aware . . . of the source of the
communication and its content.”191 For example, in Rust, the
Court held that the structure of the preventative family
planning program itself provided adequate notice to the public
that doctors’ silence pertaining to abortion reflected the
program’s intent—preventative family planning—not the
doctors’ personal beliefs.192 Jacobs contends, however, that such
notice is insufficient, particularly when the audience members
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are average individuals.193 Jacobs reasons that when the
audience members lack legal training and no reason to believe
that the message reflects a government message, “the
government should be required to make clear to individual
listeners that it is influencing the private speakers’ message.”194
The Policy Requirement has no provision to ensure that
readers of an NGO’s anti-prostitution policy statement are
aware that it reflects a government message rather than the
message of an NGO. Further, the “audience” in this case likely
consists of sex workers, other NGOs, or potential donors. It is
unlikely that these constituencies would presume the antiprostitution policy statement reflected anything other than the
organization’s own policy. Therefore, the government’s failure
to disclose its role in the promulgation of anti-prostitution
policies does not meet Jacobs’s specific accountability
requirement.
Under Jacobs’s accountability framework or the Wells
dissent’s additional factor of “who the listener believes to be the
speaker,”195 it is clear that NGOs, not the government, retain
ultimate responsibility for the content of their anti-prostitution
policy statements. In fact, a report authored by the Center for
Public Health and Human Rights at Johns Hopkins University
suggests that the Policy Requirement in several instances has
already had negative implications for Leadership Act grantees.196
Under both the four-factor test adopted by the circuit courts and
additional frameworks that have been proposed, antiprostitution policy statements do not qualify as government
speech. As a result, they are subject to regulation under the
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The Policy Requirement and Its Policy Implications

The international development community has
protested the Policy Requirement since its inception. Although
not all NGOs have filed suits like AOSI, Pathfinder, and DKT
International, members of the international reproductive-health
community stood in solidarity and voiced their displeasure with
the Policy Requirement. In 2009, twenty-one NGOs sent a letter
to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius offering comments on the
Policy Requirement.198 In that letter, organizations such as
CARE, the Guttmacher Institute, the International Women’s
Health Coalition, and Ipas-USA stated that the Policy
Requirement undermines the true goal of the Leadership Act—
to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS worldwide.199 Importantly,
the NGOs called attention to what in many ways is the crux of
the HIV/AIDS pandemic: it “is difficult[ and] complicated.”200
The Policy Requirement fails to appreciate the nuanced
problem the HIV/AIDS pandemic presents and instead takes a
dull knife to a multifaceted, amorphous problem that requires
a scalpel. Prostitution is terrible. Many, if not most, women
and girls enter into a life of prostitution against their will.201
The goal of reducing prostitution and its negative consequences
is a valid one, but it is neither the main goal of the Leadership
Act nor one that will be achieved by forcing NGOs to adopt policy
statements that ostracize and cast judgment on the women and
girls who desperately need the services, programming, and
support that NGOs provide around the world.
A representative from an NGO that was working to help
Bangladeshi sex workers gain the right to wear shoes outside
of brothels posed a simple question about the Policy
Requirement: “How can we help these beaten down,
197
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marginalized women organize themselves to achieve such
victories if we are publicly opposing what they do to earn
money?”202 As it stands now, the Policy Requirement is a singleminded approach to a problem that requires comprehensive,
holistic, and culturally sensitive responses, not only to the sex
industry, but also to the other illicit industries that support
it—such as the human trafficking industry. Holly Burkhalter,
the former policy director of Physicians for Human Rights and
its Health Action AIDS Campaign, noted that sound health
policy requires several components.203 First, a sound health
policy requires efforts to assist and liberate women and girls
engaged in the sex industry.204 Second, it requires providing
healthcare services and protection for women and girls who
remain in the sex industry and who continue to need help.205
CONCLUSION
The Policy Requirement fails on many fronts. It fails to
further the goal of the Leadership Act—the eradication of
HIV/AIDS. It regulates speech in order to quash a viewpoint
that favors actual, on-the-ground human rights and needs over
sweeping judgments that carry no practicable effect. As a
result, the Policy Requirement is unconstitutional viewpointbased discrimination that violates NGOs’ rights under the First
Amendment. The analysis put forth by the Second Circuit in
AOSI properly characterizes the Policy Requirement as
impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination. In contrast, the
D.C. Circuit’s characterization of the Policy Requirement as
government speech misconstrues the central purpose of the
Leadership Act, as well as the Policy Requirement’s purpose
within the Leadership Act as a whole.
The Supreme Court will soon decide on the
constitutionality of the Policy Requirement, and I urge the
Court to adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning. To do so would
represent not only a logical extension of the Court’s previous
unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint-based discrimination
jurisprudence, but it would also represent a strong policy
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decision that favors empowering NGOs to change the reality of
HIV/AIDS rather than adopting a singular focus that only
changes the laws.
Ami S. Watkin†
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